Exploring Regulation Policies in Distribution Networks through a Multi-Agent Simulator by Manuel de Villena Millan, Miguel et al.
Exploring Regulation Policies in Distribution
Networks through a Multi-Agent Simulator
Miguel Manuel de Villena∗, Raphael Fonteneau∗, Axel Gautier†, and Damien Ernst∗
∗Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Montefiore Institute, University of Liege
†LCII, Department of Economics, HEC Liege, University of Liege
Email: {mvillena, raphael.fonteneau, agautier, dernst}@uliege.be
Abstract—This paper presents a multi-agent simulator that
describes the interactions between the agents of a distribution
network (DN), and an environment. The agents are the users
of the DN and the electricity distribution system operator. The
environment is the set of rules (tariff design, technology costs,
or incentive schemes) that impacts the agents interactions. For a
given environment, we can simulate the evolution of the agents
and the environment itself. We assume the electricity consumers
are rational agents that may deploy distributed renewable energy
installations if they are cost-efficient compared to the retail
electricity tariff. The deployment of such installations may alter
the cost recovery scheme of the distribution system operator,
by inducing a change in the way the user use of the grid.
By modelling the cost recovery mechanism of the distribution
system operator, the system simulates the evolution of the retail
electricity tariff in response to such a change in the aggregated
consumption and production.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, proactive policy making has
supported a major paradigm shift in the power generation
sector, resulting in a progressive energy transition from fo-
ssil fuels to renewable energy sources [1]. Such an energy
transition is shaping the future of the electricity system: in
this context, numerous incentive mechanisms are fostering a
notable integration of distributed renewable electricity (DRE)
generation technologies, such as solar photovoltaic panels
(PV), into the distribution networks (DN). However, those
incentive mechanisms might have been used without the
adequate understanding of the underlying problems they may
entail: since DN are not engineered to absorb large amounts
of distributed electricity generation [2], the inclusion of a vast
volume of DRE may cause severe technical problems [3].
Additionally, regulatory problems may appear also as a result
of DRE adoption [4]. In our work we focus on the latter,
which range from the over-compensation of DRE owners to
the potential failure of the cost recovery mechanisms of the
distribution system operators (DSO) [5].
This paper aims at presenting a methodology for assessing
the potential regulatory problems stemming from a set of
regulation rules (including the incentive mechanisms) that
stimulates a heavy DRE adoption. Thus, with this methodo-
logy we may take any set of regulation rules as inputs, and
compute their impact on a DN. Such an impact is measured
with two metrics: (i) the evolution of the retail electricity
price (simply retail price from now on) over time, and (ii)
the evolution of the proportion of DRE-owners and non-DRE
owners in the DN over time. The set of rules that drives these
evolutions is known as an environment, and consists of three
elements, as explained in [6]:
• tariff design: this consists of the type of charges applied
to the customers for their grid use (e.g. volumetric tariffs,
or capacity tariffs);
• technology costs evolution: this includes the prices for
generation and storage technologies; and
• incentive mechanism: this is the combination of tech-
nologies and/or support schemes that help DRE become
economically competitive, (e.g. a monetary aid awarded
to the DRE owners over the lifetime of the DRE).
To simulate the impact of a given environment on a DN, we
need to introduce a set of agents who will interact with it,
over a finite time horizon. There are three types of agents:
• DRE owners: users of the DN that own a DRE installation
(also known as prosumers);
• non-DRE owners: users of the DN that do not own a DRE
installation (also known as consumers); and
• distribution system operator (DSO): operator of the DN.
As a result of the agents interactions with the environment,
the DN will evolve in a dynamical system. At every time step
of this system, the two mentioned metrics will be computed,
enabling the observation of such an evolution.
The methodology presented in this paper is based on a
multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system formalisation that
models the interactions of a some agents with an environment,
and computes the resulting evolution of the DN. From this
evolution, we may compare different environments. Our main
contributions are:
• We provide a description of our multi-agent discrete-time
dynamical system formalisation. Such a formalisation
allows us to test different environments, in particular we
introduce (i) two tariff designs, and (ii) two incentive
mechanisms. This is detailed in Section II.
• We show the simulator functioning by testing different
environments. This is presented in Section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
In our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system, we
model the electricity users as rational agents who are —in
principle— exposed to retail prices, and that may invest in
optimally sized DRE installations, provided that these are cost-
efficient compared to the retail price. As a result of users
deploying DRE installations, the DSO cost recovery mech-
anism may be altered, inducing a change in the distribution
component of the retail price (distribution tariff from now on)
for the subsequent time-step of the dynamical system. These
two effects (DRE adoption and distribution tariff evolution),
are computed at every time-step of a discrete-time dynamical
system in which the interactions of the agents with the
environment will drive the evolution of the DN. Thus, in this
methodology we: (A) start by explaining how the interactions
between the agents and the environment occur, (B) elaborating
then on the different introduced environments, and (C) and
finalising by providing a description of the agents modelling.
A. Interactions
The interactions between the agents and the environment are
computed at every time-step of our dynamical system. These
interactions depend on the nature of the agent, namely:
• the DRE owners interact by trading electricity with the
DN. These trades occur in the form of imports: DN →
user, and/or exports: DN ← user;
• the non-DRE owners interact also by trading electricity
with the DN. In this case these trades occur only in the
form of imports: DN → user.
• the DSO interacts by computing a distribution tariff that
allows it to break-even.
Through these interactions, the agents incur costs and collect
revenues. The relation between costs and revenues will drive
the evolution of the DN. Computing these interactions, at every
time-step, involves calculating: (1) the yearly electricity costs
of the users, (2) the yearly electricity revenues of the users (if
any), and (3) the new distribution tariff determined by the DSO
according to its cost recovery mechanism. These calculations
depend on the environments, which are defined next.
B. Environments
In the presented multi-agent system, we introduce a number
of options to build an environment:
Depending on the tariff design:
• a1 - Volumetric: electricity trades are paid for/collected
according to volumes of energy [e/kWh].
• a2 - Volumetric and capacity: two terms, the first one is
volumetric [e/kWh], and the second one is based on a
fixed charge per capacity contracted by the user [e/kWp].
Depending on the technology costs:
• b1 - Linearly decreasing trend over time.
Depending on the incentive mechanism: in particular we focus
on the compensation mechanism. By compensation mecha-
nism we refer to the manner the electricity trades between the
users and the DN are recorded [7]. We consider two distinct
compensation mechanisms, as described in [5]:
• c1 - Net-metering (NM): system consisting of one meter
that records the imports by running forwards, and the
exports by running backwards, this entails that both
directions be assigned with the same monetary value,
namely the retail tariff. Furthermore, the total exports
are upper bounded by the total imports for a determined
billing period, per user.
• c2 - Net-purchasing (NP): system consisting of two sepa-
rate meters for the imports and the exports respectively,
this implies that the imports are paid for at retail tariff,
whereas the exports are paid at a selling price.
Constructing an environment necessitates choosing one el-
ement per option. Consequently, with these settings we can
create four different families of environments:
• e1 = a1+b1+c1
• e2 = a1+b1+c2
• e3 = a2+b1+c1
• e4 = a2+b1+c2
Each of these families depends on the retail price, the capacity
price, and/or the selling price. Consequently, it is possible to
create any number of environments by setting different values
of these three prices.
The three calculations introduced in subsection II-A (costs
of the users, revenues of the users, and cost recovery mech-
anism of the DSO) depend on the family of environments.
Let N = {1, . . . , N} denote the set with the time-steps of
our discrete-time dynamical system. And let I = {1, . . . , I}
denote the users of the DN.
a) Family of environments e1: the electricity costs of the
users are computed according to equation (1). The revenues
of the users are φi,n = 0 for this environment, since under
net-metering the produced electricity is not sold to the grid.
Finally the DSO computation of the new distribution tariff for



















∀n ∈ N (2)
with ∆(d)n−1 = R̂
(d)
n − R(d)n , where R(d)n are the actual mea-
sured revenues, and R̂(d)n are the expected revenues computed








i,n ∀n ∈ N (3)
b) Family of environments e2: the electricity costs and
the revenues of the users are computed according to equations
(4) and (5) respectively. The DSO computation of the follow-
ing distribution tariff is performed as in environment e1 (see
equations (2) and (3)).
ψi,n = ρ
(−)
i,n ·Π(in)n ∀i, n ∈ I ×N (4)
φi,n = ρ
(+)
i,n ·Π(sp)n ∀i, n ∈ I ×N (5)
c) Family of environments e3: the electricity costs of
the users are computed by means of equation (6). The users
revenues are φi,n = 0 (same rationale as before). The DSO
computation of the distribution tariff follows equation (7).
Furthermore, in this case there is a capacity tariff which the





























∀n ∈ N (8)
with ∆(c)n−1 = R̂
(c)





n are measured once the period is completed, R̂
(c)
n
is determined by means of equation (9), and R̂(d)n is computed
as in the family of environments e1 (see equation (3)).
R̂(c)n = Π
(cap)
n · I ∀n ∈ N (9)
d) Family of environments e4: the electricity costs of
the users are computed with equation (10). The revenues
of the users are computed as in the family of environments
e2 (equation (5)). The distribution tariff is computed as in












i,n total imports of user i at period n
ρ
(+)
i,n total exports of user i at period n
ψi,n electricity costs of user i at period n
φi,n revenues of user i at period n
Ω
(d)
n costs of the DSO (volumetric) at period n
Ω
(c)
n costs of the DSO (capacity) at period n
∆
(d)
n−1 imbalance of the DSO (volumetric) of period n− 1
∆
(c)
n−1 imbalance of the DSO (capacity) of period n− 1
R̂
(d)
n expected revenues of the DSO (volumetric) at period n
R̂
(c)
n expected revenues of the DSO (capacity) at period n
R
(d)
n actual revenues of the DSO (volumetric) at period n
R
(c)
n actual revenues of the DSO (capacity) at period n
D̂n expected demand of the users at period n
Ĉn expected peak demand of the users at period n
Π
(sp)
n users selling price at period n
Π
(cap)
n capacity price at period n
Π
(in)
n retail price at period n *
Π
(dis)
n distribution tariff at period n *
λn costs of energy, transmission, and taxes *
* The relation between Π(in)n and Π
(dis)





n + λn ∀n ∈ N .
All of the presented equations depend on different parame-






n , D̂n, and Ĉn. These parameters
are computed when modelling the agents of the system. The
other parameters in table I (Π(sp)n , and λn) are inputs of the
model. The rest of table I are variables whose computations









n , and Π
(in)
n ).
C. Agents of the system
Once we have introduced the different environments, and
how the interactions with these occur, we can describe how
the agents are modelled. In our system we have three types
of agents: DRE owners, non-DRE owners, and DSO. The first
two are the users of the DN, whereas the third one is the
operator of the DN.
1) DRE owners: these users are modelled relying on an
optimisation framework instantiated in the form of a linear
program (LP). This LP minimises the levelized cost of elec-
tricity (LCOE) of the DRE installation. The LCOE is the
average total cost to deploy and operate a DRE installation,
divided by the total energy consumed by the user over the
project lifetime. With this LP we can extract, at every time-
step, the values of ρ(−)i,n and ρ
(+)
i,n . The LP formalisation is
presented in the next section (Section III).
2) non-DRE owners: at the initialisation of the system,
we assume zero installed DRE capacity for all the users (i.e.
all users are non-DRE owners). Then at every time-step, the
system updates the proportion of users who have deployed a
DRE installation. Thus, we define two groups of non-DRE
owners: group A: denoting the users who may deploy a DRE
installation, and group B: comprising the users who cannot
invest in a DRE installation due to technical or economic
constraints. We model these two groups differently:
a) group A: we resort to the same LP we use to model
the DRE owners. However, in this case we use it to extract the
LCOE of the potential DRE installation a user of this group
could deploy. By comparing this LCOE with the retail price,
a gradient-like driver is created: if the LCOE is lower than the
retail price, the user will have a probability p > 0 of actually
deploying the DRE installation that leads to such an LCOE.
Once a user from group A deploys a DRE installation, it is
modelled as a DRE owner until the end of the simulation. If a
user group A does not deploy a DRE installation at a particular
time-step, it is modelled in the same fashion as group B users,
for this particular time-step. However, at the subsequent time-
steps, this user will have a new opportunity of deploying a
DRE installation.
b) group B: we compute the yearly electricity demand
of every user, which is covered entirely by the DN.
3) DSO: the last of the agents is modelled by computing,
at every time-step, its cost recovery mechanism, as introduced
previously. Then, the DSO will calculate a new distribution
tariff for the subsequent time-step that allows it to break-
even. To compute this cost recovery mechanism, the following
parameters are required: Ω(d)n , Ω
(c)
n , D̂n, and Ĉn.
Ω
(d)
n : costs of the DSO related with the volume of energy
distributed to the users of the grid. At the initialisation of the
system, we assume a balanced system where the costs of the
DSO are fully recovered by its revenue. Thus, we assume the
initial costs equal to the initial revenues (aggregated demand
of all users times the distribution tariff). At every time step the
revenues may decrease due to the DRE deployment. Hence, we
measure the total actual revenues of the DSO (R(d)n ). Assuming
that the cost recovery mechanism recovers all the previous
economic imbalances, we use these revenues as costs of the





n : costs of the DSO related with the capacity required
by the users of the grid. Similarly to the previous case, we
assume a balanced initial state where the costs of the DSO
are fully recovered by its revenue. Thus, we assume the initial
costs equal to the initial revenues (aggregated capacity fees of
the users). At every time step, the DRE deployment may cause
the fees to vary, altering the actual revenues from capacity
fees (R(c)n ). These revenues are used as DSO costs for the
subsequent time-step (R(c)n−1 = Ω
(c)
n ).
D̂n: expected volume of energy distributed at every time-
step. It is computed before the initialisation of the period, and
corresponds to the last observed aggregated demand (Dn−1)
of the users, thus Dn−1 = D̂n. Hence, this does not take into
account the DRE installations that may have been deployed
from n− 1 to n.
Ĉn: expected aggregated peak demand of the users at
every time-step. As in the previous case, it is computed before
the initialisation of the period, and corresponds to the last
observed aggregated peak demand (Cn−1) of the users, thus
Cn−1 = Ĉn. The DRE installations potentially deployed at
the previous period are not taken into account.
III. LP FORMALISATION
In this section we formalise the optimisation framework
in the form of an LP, used to model the DRE owners and
the group A of the non-DRE owners. On the one hand, the
DRE owners are modelled to compute their electricity trades,
which were introduced in the previous section as imports and
exports. On the other hand, the non-DRE owners of group A
are modelled to determine their minimised LCOE, obtained
for an optimally sized DRE installation.
The optimisation horizon is set to Y ∈ N years which are
divided into 8760 time-steps (Y ×8760). Let T = {0, . . . , T−
1}, with T = 8760, represent a time discretisation of one year
(in hours). Moreover let Y = {0, . . . , Y − 1}, represent the
years of the optimisation. All of the parameters and variables
presented in this section depend on N . Furthermore, this LP
runs for every individual user in set I.
Let χ represent the investment costs as a linear function
of technology prices and sizing configuration. These costs are
computed according to the following equation:
χ = p · P (pv) + Y
B
· b · P (bat) (11)
where p represents the optimal PV size in kWp, b is the opti-
mal battery size in kWh, P (pv) and P (bat) are the technology
prices (PV and battery respectively), and B is lifetime of the
battery.
The yearly costs of operation are represented by ξy , and
computed by means of the following equation.
ξy = µy +my + ζy ∀y ∈ Y (12)
where µy are the yearly electricity costs, my represents the
yearly costs of operation and maintenance, and ζy stands for
the recovered costs. The electricity costs depend on the family
of environments: for family e1 we use equation (13), for e2
we use equation (14), for e3 we use equation (15), and for the











































+ Π(cap) ∀y ∈ Y (16)
where ρ(−)t are the hourly imports, and ρ
(+)
t represents the
hourly exports. Π(in) and Π(cap) are the retail and the capacity
price. These prices are fixed across the entire LP horizon, and
correspond to the nth prices determined by the discrete-time
dynamical system. The operation and maintenance costs my






· b ∀y ∈ Y (17)
Finally, the recovered costs are also environment dependent. In
light of this, families of environments e1 and e3 have ζy = 0,









∀y ∈ Y (18)
The energy balance of the system depends on the imports
ρ
(−)
t , exports ρ
(+)
t , the electricity produced by the PV array
kt, the hourly demand U
(d)
t , the maximum hourly production
U
(p)
t , the energy flow into the battery j
(−)
t , the energy flow out
of the battery j(+)t , the efficiency of charge η
c and discharge
ηd the batteries, and the depth of discharge of the batteries
dod. The energy flows into and out of the battery also depend
on the variation of the state of charge (soc) between t−1 and
t. Thus, the following equations control the energy balance,
taking into account the state of charge of the batteries:
ρ
(+)
t − ρ(−)t = kt − U (d)t − j(−)t + j(+)t ∀t ∈ T , (19)
with:
kt = p · U (p)t ∀t ∈ T (20)
j
(−)
t ≤ b · F (−) ∀t ∈ T (21)
j
(+)
t ≤ b · F (+) ∀t ∈ T (22)









t · η(c) ∀t ∈ T \ {0}
soc0 ∈ [b · dod, b] for t = 0
(24)
Finally, let LCOE denote the general objective function
that represents the levelized cost of electricity. This objective











where the yearly demand of the system is defined as dy =∑T−1
t=0 U
(d)
t , and r represents the discount rate.
IV. TEST CASE
To illustrate our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical sys-
tem, an example is presented. In this example, we simulate one
environment of each family of environments. Thus, we create
four environments, according to the four described families:
• Env. A: corresponds to the family of environments e1.
We propose a volumetric tariff with a compensation
mechanism consisting of net-metering. In this case, the
distribution tariff is initially set to Π(dis)0 = 0.09e/kWh.
• Env. B: corresponds to the family of environments e2.
This case is based on a volumetric tariff with a com-
pensation mechanism consisting of net-purchasing. As in
the previous case, the distribution tariff is initially set
to Π(dis)0 = 0.09e/kWh. The selling price is fixed to
Π
(sp)
n = 0.08e/kWh (constant over the simulation).
• Env. C: corresponds to the family of environments e3.
We create this case with a distribution tariff with two
components: volume and capacity. The first component
represented with a volumetric fee conveyed to the users
by means a distribution tariff which is initially set to
Π
(dis)
0 = 0.045e/kWh. The second component is a ca-
pacity fee, set initially to Π(cap)0 = 223e for installations
up to 10 kWp, this term will not evolve in our simulation,
since we do not let the users adjust their peak demand.
• Env. D: corresponds to the family of environments e4.
As in the previous case, there are two terms. The ca-
pacity term is the same as case C (Π(cap)0 = 223e for
installations up to 10 kWp which cannot evolve in our
simulations). The distribution tariff term is initially set to
Π
(dis)
0 = 0.045e/kWh. Furthermore, the selling price is
fixed to Π(sp)n = 0.08e/kWh.
The value of λn is fixed to 0.13e/kWh for all cases. The
technology costs are initially set to P (pv) = 1500e/kWp and
P (bat) = 300e/kWh; they are assumed to evenly decrease at
every period n by 0.07%. The optimisation horizon Y is set
to 20 years. The efficiencies are set fixed to η(c) = 0.95 and
η(d) = 0.95. Finally the dod is fixed to 10%.
At the initialisation of the system, all the users are non-
DRE owners. Hence, to represent every agent in the proposed
multi-agent tool, the model includes two groups of medium
size residential users (peak demand of around 3 kW). Group
A: modelling the heterogeneity of DN users involves the rep-
resentation of every user as an individual agent. To introduce
them in the simulation, the multi-agent model necessitates
their electricity demand profile and their production profile. In
the analysed test case, we create different synthetic demand
profiles with the help of the CREST model [9]. As for
the production profile, we count on real PV measurements
expressed in kW/kWp. Group B: the remaining customers of
the DN must be modelled only in terms of net energy off-take.
At every time-step of the multi-agent system simulation,
we keep track of the deployed DRE units, as well as of
the distribution tariff adjustment. Thus, we can determine
the evolution of the deployed capacities of PV and battery.
Moreover, it is possible to compute the evolution of the
distribution tariff for each case. Two figures depict the two
metrics considered: the evolution of DRE deployment and
optimal size: Figure 1; and the evolution of the distribution
tariff: Figure 2, for the four distinct environments.
Fig. 1. Cumulative PV and battery capacities of the deployed DRE, over
the presented discrete-time dynamical system. The economically optimal size
of the deployed DRE installations is influenced in a large extent by the
environment. In this figure, we observe these different users behaviours under
four distinct environments.
Regarding the size of the installations, we observe two
different behaviours of the four environments:
• A and C do not deploy batteries, these two environments
Fig. 2. Evolution of the distribution tariff. The deployment of DRE units
induces an increase in the distribution tariff. Such an increase features a
different extent depending on the environment.
rely on NM as incentive mechanism, therefore not de-
ploying batteries since, with this system, batteries and
imports are perfect substitutes. Since there is no incentive
to sell electricity (see equations (13) and (15)), the PV
capacity is adjusted to simply cover their peak demand.
• B and D deploy some batteries to become more self-
sufficient, reducing the imports. PV deployment results
2.5 times larger than in the other two environments, since
there exists an incentive to sell electricity (see equations
(14) and (16)). The difference between B and D lies in the
fixed capacity term, which makes difficult the recovery of
the installation costs for case D.
Regarding the distribution tariff, the upper sub-figure in
Figure 2 indicates that introducing a capacity term (Env. C
and D) will considerably reduce the effect of an increasing
distribution tariff, induced by the DRE deployment. However,
when inspecting the lower sub-figure in Figure 2 (change in
distribution tariff relative to the initial state), we can observe
that the increase in the distribution tariff occurs predominantly
in those environments with NM as incentive mechanism (Env.
A and C), demonstrating the unfitness of this compensation
mechanism to cope with DRE deployment.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a multi-agent simulator to describe
the interaction between distribution networks and consumers,
for any regulatory technical environment. In this system, elec-
tricity consumers interacting with a single distribution network
are modelled as rational agents that may invest in optimised
distributed renewable energy installations. The distribution
tariff is adapted according to cost recovery mechanism of
the DSO (must break-even), that depends on the distributed
renewable energy that is produced and consumed in the
distribution network.
To illustrate the performance of the multi-agent system, we
have designed and simulated four different examples based
on the four families of environments introduced in this paper.
The simulator allows to illustrate the impact of the regulation
policies on many aspects: (i) the evolution of the electricity
distribution tariff; (ii) the evolution of DRE deployment; and
(iii) the optimised configurations of distributed renewable
energy installations (production and storage capacities).
Preliminary results show a more volatile distribution tariff
when net-metering is chosen as incentive mechanism, as a
result of the deployment of distributed renewable energy units.
This remains true also when a capacity term is added to the
distribution costs. These results can be further explored in a
future work, by scaling up the simulator introducing a larger
user diversity.
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